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Is the Northern Ireland Peace Process Flagging?
Recent disturbances in Belfast naturally invite questions as to how this is grounded in a
longer history of conflict within Northern Ireland. Jim Hughes explains how the current social
strife is deeply rooted in the past but is also a product of profound changes, not least of all
demographic, within the country.
The conf lict in Northern Ireland has been f ought as intensely in the arena of  symbolic
power as in any other. Under the old Unionist Stormont Regime (1921-72) the Irish
tricolour was never f ormally banned, but in practice there was litt le toleration of  its public
display. On grounds of  “public order”, Unionism limited displays of  the tricolour to specif ically catholic
cultural domains and the catholic ghettos.
The assertion of  Unionist hegemony could of ten assume crude f orms, such as in the Divis Street riot
during the General Election campaign of  October 1964, one of  the key trigger events leading up to the
“Troubles” of  1969. It was sparked by the removal by police of  a tricolour f rom the election of f ice of  an
independent republican candidate in the Nationalist Falls area, which was classed as “provocative”. It was
an event which apparently radicalised Gerry Adams into joining Sinn Féin. The vote by Belf ast City Council
on 3 December 2012 to only f ly the Union f lag on 15 designated days during the year, in line with the
practice of  the Stormont Assembly and some other councils in the North, was a demonstration of  how
the balance of  polit ical power has been transf ormed over the years since the Good Friday Agreement of
1998. Nationalists wanted a total ban, but compromised on a centrist Alliance Party proposal. It marks a
dramatic change to the policy of  the last century by which the f lag was displayed on top of  the building
365 days a year.
Not surprisingly, it was an unwelcome reminder to
protestants of  their loss of  hegemonic power, not
only in Northern Ireland, but in its capital Belf ast. The
vote was f ollowed by weeks of  minor rioting and
blockage protests in some working class areas of
Belf ast, and on an even smaller scale outside the city.
For some commentators the disturbances suggest
f lagging protestant support f or the Agreement. The
af f air, however, is more emblematic of  deeper
structural changes in society.
Demography, or in local parlance “headcountery”, is
the pivot f or power struggles in a divided society like
Northern Ireland. The second 2011 census release
occurred almost simultaneously with the loyalist
disturbances in December. For the f irst t ime, the protestant community in Northern Ireland no longer has
an overall majority. Of  1.8 million cit izens, protestants account f or 48 per cent (down f rom 53 per cent in
2001), catholics almost 46 per cent (up f rom 44 per cent in 2001), and the rest are either other religious
minorit ies or atheists. For the f irst t ime, a question on national identity had been included, and it revealed
that less than half  the population (48 per cent) regarded themselves as “Brit ish” (and 40 per cent def ined
themselves as “Brit ish only”), while 29% labelled themselves as Northern Irish, and 28% as Irish. In
Belf ast, catholics now outnumber protestants by 49 per cent to 42 per cent. Furthermore the trend is f or
a growing catholic population while the protestant population is in decline and ageing. Northern Ireland
has one of  the youngest populations in Europe, and in every f ive year age group under 25 catholics are
well over 50 per cent. Education, still overwhelmingly divided by religion, is increasingly dominated by the
catholic secondary sector, and catholics are also in a large majority at the two universit ies in the North,
with obvious implications f or f uture upward social mobility.
The disturbances are not driven by deprivation. UK government statistics show that the most deprived
areas in Northern Ireland are in Belf ast, but they are catholic areas. Indeed, the most deprived areas at
the start of  the Troubles in 1969 are still the most deprived today, some f orty odd years later. In addition
to demography, we should add the radical shif t in the polit ical economy of  Northern Ireland, and Belf ast,
over the last f orty years. The decline of  manuf acturing, engineering, textiles (Belf ast’s last linen f actory
closed this week) and shipbuilding has undermined the privileged posit ion of  the protestant working class
as part of  the hegemonic “Unionist Family”. Traditionally, the protestant working class was socially and
polit ically disciplined by its class of  f oremen and skilled workers, its association with the police, local
milit ias, and the Brit ish Army. These institutions provided leadership and role models. Their
disappearance, coupled with inner-city redevelopment, has blighted the cohesion of  the protestant
working class, and the old authority f igures and structures have been replaced by the rise of  the
paramilitaries during the conf lict. Some, but not enough, of  the loyalist paramilitary ex-prisoners have
made the transit ion into community work and reconciliation projects. These are communities that have
been polit ically marginalised due to the post-Agreement f actionalisation and rise of  class polit ics within
Unionism, but mostly the marginalisation is social.
It is a paradox of  the peace agreement in Northern Ireland that it has f ostered inter-ethnic elite
accommodation and cooperation (a f orm of  consociational elite pact), while at least in the short term
hardening the obstacles to a progressive social transf ormation f rom divided society to a more integrated
one. The Agreement itself  recognised that changing society was a crit ical element of  polit ical
stabilisation, yet its content in this area was minimal and rhetorical. The institutional engineering f ocused
on the minutiae of  the governing institutions, security arrangements, and the relationships between the
UK and Ireland.
Peacemaking and reconciliation was largely lef t to “civil society”. This is a big business in Northern
Ireland. By the time of  the Belf ast Agreement, according to of f icial f igures, there were approximately
5000 voluntary and community organisations alone in Northern Ireland, which provided employment to
some 33,000 people – more than were employed in manuf acturing. The income was in the hundreds of
millions annually, most of  which came f rom the EU’s Special Support Programme f or Peace and
Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (currently in a “Peace III” iteration). The f unding has created a
somewhat parasit ical private sector of  prof essional “mediators” and academic consultants. Equally, this
f unding has helped to build community organisations and sustain economic lif e in working class ghettos,
where f unds are normally brokered and distributed usef ully by polit ical organizations and ex-paramilitary
organizations (or both). Some of  that work is being set back years by the current disturbances.
There is a general recognition that the two key pillars of  structural social division are housing and
education. Belf ast experienced one of  the largest ethnic cleansing episodes (up to 60,000 people, mainly
catholics) in Europe between the end of  World War Two and the collapse of  communism. The Brit ish
government’s own research f ound that housing became more segregated throughout the conf lict, a
process that was f ormalised in public housing on security grounds by the government’s own housing
quango. By 2003 more than 70% of  Housing Executive estates were more than 90% Protestant or more
than 90% Roman Catholic. Similarly, school education in Northern Ireland is almost wholly segregated,
with around only 6 per cent of  students attending interdenominational schools (ie they are still schools
with a religious ethos).
The UK government’s A Shared Future  consultation and policy aimed to address the structures of  the
divide, and was pushed during the interlude in 2003-05 when the Agreement was in crisis and its polit ical
institutions were temporarily suspended. The stated policy goal was normative: “a shared society def ined
by a culture of  tolerance: a normal, civic society” and “interdependence”. There was also, however a
public management agenda to rationalise and reduce duplications in public expenditure. This approach
was abandoned to achieve the St Andrew’s Accord and the reestablishment of  the power-sharing
Executive in Northern Ireland in 2007. Similarly, the government “parked” the report of  its Consultative
Group on the Past in January 2009 which was supposed to recommend ways of  dealing with “legacy”
issues f rom the conf lict, largely due to Unionist opposition.
It took almost three years f or the new DUP-Sinn Féin Executive to produce its own policy on social
transf ormation in the Programme For Cohesion, Sharing And Integration (July 2010). It ref lected a more
pragmatic understanding of  Northern Ireland’s divided society, and stressed the practical tasks of
creating shared and saf e spaces through local community involvement. Its concern is with ‘mutual
accommodation’, a perspective which is accepting of  the ethnic divide, rather than the grand vision of
‘reconciliation’. The local strategy is f undamentally opposed to Whitehall’s Shared Future, ref lecting the
dif f erences between bottom-up versus top-down solutions. One of  the new Executive’s strategic aims is
to promote pride in an “intercultural society” but the crit ics of  the Agreement, especially liberals, see the
new concept as a “reif ication of  ‘cultures’”.
The f lag af f air in Belf ast ref lects deep continuit ies and changes in Northern  Ireland’s society. The
structure of  the divide is at root a product of  f our centuries of  colonial authoritarian social engineering.
Only authoritarian social engineering can rapidly achieve the kind of  social transf ormation aspired to by
the crit ics of  the Agreement. The demographic changes at work in Northern Ireland are having multiple
knock-on ef f ects in the divided society and in its multiple domains of  segregation: relationships and
marriage, work, culture, use of  public services and f acilit ies, public policy on welf are, health, education,
and leisure, use of  public transport, employment, shopping, and of  course security. There is also the
psychological f rame with regard to mental mapping of  territory, “ownership” and movement within public
space, and calculations about identity, power, risk and the desirability of  contact. Not surprisingly, some
sections of  the protestant community, in particular but not exclusively parts of  its working class, have
been discomf ited by these structural changes not only because of  the perceived threat to identity but
also because of  the shif t towards more equitable power relations and the growing “presence” of
catholics.
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